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I

“ only date white girls.” “I don’t think black women are
hot.” “I have a fetish for Asian-Americans.” Each of these statements expresses a racial preference for dating partners. Moreover,
these preferences aren’t merely inclusionary. They are also exclusionary in the sense that people acting upon them will both include and preclude others as potential spouses because of their
race. Racial dating preferences have been slowly diversifying:
statistics show over fifteen percent of newly-wed couples in the
US are interracial, a three-fold increase to the number 50 years
ago.1 Nonetheless, interracial couples comprise only a tenth of all
American couples, and white people continue to remain the least
likely to marry people of color, demonstrating stronger intra-race
mating than all other races.2
The morality of race-based dating preferences is thus a
sensitive, but important issue, partly because it exposes our internalized racially colored desires and partly because it is charged
with correcting them. In this paper, I inspect what makes certain
preferences racist, and others less morally problematic, but still
indefensible. I build on a valuable framework of race-based favoritism proposed by J.L. Garcia, and extend it to racial dating
practices, finding that it fails to capture what is morally problematic in a suspicious case of racial preference. I then build on Garcia’s baseline framework to create a new structure of moral requirements. My modified framework proposes that exclusionary
racial preferences in dating are not morally defensible because
they deny people of other races a ‘fair chance’ to be potential
partners. Consequently, I consider objections to and the implications of my theory, concluding with a discussion of the societal
shaping of our sexual, among other, desires.
In The Heart of Racism, Jorge Garcia proposes what he
calls a “volitional conception of racism.”3 According to him, atti-
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tudes and comportments, rather than beliefs or cognitive theories,
make people racist. But what constitutes a racist attitude? Garcia
thinks “one is a racist when one either does not care at all or does
not care enough (i.e., as much as morality requires) or does not
care in the right ways about people assigned to a certain racial
group, where this disregard is based on racial classification.”4 The
volitional account of racism is then fundamentally concerned with
what we morally owe others because of their humanity. Violating,
or falling short of these minimal moral duties because of
someone’s race is what constitutes racism: “Racism, thus, will
often offend against justice…because one sort of injury to another
is withholding from her the respect she is owed.”5
Garcia applies this framework to show how race-based
favoritism may be justified. He argues that “Preferential treatment, while race-based, is not normally based on any racial disregard” toward people of other races.6 We may “licitly choose to
bestow favors instead on those to whom we feel more warmly…I
may give A more than A has a claim to get from me and more
than I give B, while nevertheless giving B everything to which
she is entitled (and even more).”7 Thus, “…discriminating in favor of R1s [Race 1s] need not entail discriminating against R2s
[Race 2s].”8 So, according to Garcia, race-based preference are
morally acceptable as long as they do not deny what must be accorded to those of other races. Here is a reconstruction of the argument:
Premise 1: We have a duty to give to people of all r aces at
least what they are morally owed. This is the baseline moral
requirement.
Premise 2: Falling shor t of this thr eshold constitutes mor al shortcoming and is reprehensible.
Premise 3: Giving people mor e than they ar e mor ally
owed because of their race is morally acceptable.
Conclusion: We can give cer tain people mor e than they
are morally owed because of their race, provided that in doing
so, we do not fall short of our minimum moral duties towards
people of other races.
Racial preferences in dating, being a kind of favoritism,
lie within the domain of Garcia’s argument. By dating, I mean
established relationships. I am not concerned with short-term sex-
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ual relations, one-night stands, hook-ups or the like. Instead, for
the purposes of my argument, I will consider sentimental, longterm partnerships, even if some of my claims hold for other sexual arrangements. Extending Garcia’s framework for race-based
favoritism to racial dating permits us to extrapolate the conditions
under which race-based dating preferences would be morally acceptable: it is defensible to only date people of a certain race provided one does not violate moral duties toward people of other
races. Since no one is owed sex or relationships, nor does one
owe others sex or relationships, no moral duties are violated in a
dating scheme that filters potential partners by race. To proceed, I
will pose two common and intuitively problematic cases of racial
dating. Each will subsequently be charitably analyzed per Garcia’s framework, and the results of the analysis will provide insight
into the correctness of the system. The purpose of this project is
to test the sturdiness of Garcia’s framework; a false negative in
either case will indicate a flaw somewhere in the system.
The first case is as follows. John, a resident of an all-white
fraternity in Kentucky, cracks open a can of beer and exclaims to
his friends about a girl who asked him out last week: “I won’t
date her because she’s black.” John’s proclamation affirms there
is something about blackness that is unworthy, i.e. there is some
improper, even disparaging characteristic tied to being black that
makes his potential partner unsuitable in his eyes. Per Garcia’s
framework, John is a racist. Why? Because he denigrates his admirer on account of her race, violating the minimum duty of respect owed to black women, on the grounds that she is black. I
agree with Garcia; I think most people would consider John a racist and Garcia’s account accurately explains why he is intuitively
and normatively so. Garcia’s framework thus passes the first test.
The second, and more interesting case is the following:
Jack, a white male North-East college athlete gestures at a black
classmate in the cafeteria, leans across the table and quietly discloses to his white friends who are engaged in a discussion about
women: “I’m not a racist, but I wouldn’t date her because I’m just
not attracted to black women. I wouldn’t consider dating a black
woman because I just don’t find them pretty. It’s just like Aziz,
who only dates white girls. I don’t like dark skin, or braids or
broad lips, just like he doesn’t find yellow skin attractive. I don’t
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think there’s anything wrong with black women though.”
There is a reason this case makes us feel uncomfortable.
Most people would agree there is something intuitively problematic about it, but what makes this latter case problematic is not as
obvious as in the former. While John is quite obviously insulting
a black woman because of her race, the same cannot be said of
Jack, who is making a more nuanced statement of his sexual preferences. No person or race has a right to sex or partnerships, so
the fact that Jack does not engage in relationships with black
women could seem justified. Indeed, Garcia’s framework does
conclude that Jack’s remark is morally defensible: not dating
black women because of their race would not violate any duties
owed to them; since no one is owed a relationship, rejecting people on the basis of their race – like Jack’s rejection of the black
woman – is morally defensible. This is a surprising conclusion
and does not accord with the intuitions of many. Excluding people on the basis of their race as potential partners seems morally
problematic, even when seemingly nuanced explanations like
Jack’s are offered. Moreover, even if Garcia’s framework is to be
conceived of as not just a descriptive but a prescriptive account of
race-based preferences, the second case seems morally suspicious
in a way Garcia’s framework cannot capture. Excluding people as
potential partners because of their race violates some kind of moral requisite that Garcia’s framework does not encompass. Jack,
our second white male, is thus a false negative.
Despite its false negative, I think there is a way to repair
Garcia’s framework. The repair work consists in building upon it,
and my subsequent modified moral structure diagnoses and explains Jack’s moral shortcoming. In my analysis, the defect in
Garcia’s argument lies at Premise 1. To remind readers, Premise
1 states: “We have a duty to give to people of all races at least
what they are morally owed. This is the baseline moral requirement.” I contend we should give to others more than what our
minimum moral duties toward them entail. In dating, this is especially important. Here is how I rectify the framework: I keep Garcia’s conception of a moral baseline because it is helpful in capturing what is racist in John’s case. Moreover, it explains the canonical case of racist dating today, in the US and across the
world. Then, I add a supplementary moral stipulation to Garcia’s
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framework. By supplementary stipulation, I mean a moral requisite that is less stringent than an overriding duty, in the sense that
falling short of this supplementary moral stipulation implies a
lesser opprobrium than falling short of Garcia’s original baseline
moral duties. The nature of the additional requirement is to give
people of all races what I call a ‘fair chance’ to be a potential
partner. To give others a fair chance to be a potential partner
means to not simply discard their possibility as a future partner
because of their race but to allow them the opportunity to appeal
to oneself, even if one doesn’t end up dating them. Practically, a
fair chance would look like interacting with people of all races
and getting to know them at deeper levels, engaging with them
and being willing to learn their perspectives, putting oneself in
the physical and mental spaces where they could appeal to oneself, and going out to drinks, coffee and even first dates with
them. Truly giving others a fair chance does not instrumentalize
them; it treats them as potential partners, with the genuine possibility of a future relationship – as ends in themselves and not as
means to some other end.
According to the supplemented framework, our second
white male, Jack, is morally reprehensible because he rejects
black women without giving them a fair chance. He is unprepared
to go on dates, chat, interact, get to know them on deeper levels,
unwilling to learn their perspectives or even allow them the space
and the occasion to appeal to him and be a potential partner. The
violation of the ‘fair chance’ principle, then, is what makes his
case morally problematic. As Jack’s case shows, the fair chance
stipulation does both descriptive and normative work; it explains
why the case is intuitively wrong and proposes how we should act
instead. Garcia’s basic framework enhanced with the ‘fair chance’
stipulation hence tests correctly against edge cases of race-based
dating preferences.
An attentive reader may object. She may ask why the ‘fair
chance’ stipulation isn’t simply part of Garcia’s original baseline
duties, but some additional requirement built on top of the framework. In other words, why is giving a fair chance to people of all
races not a moral duty we owe them but some not-as-important
stipulation? This objection is best answered in light of our aforedetailed cases. Had we included the ‘fair chance’ principle as a
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minimum moral duty, we would be inclined to conclude Jack, our
second white male is racist, a conclusion that I think is inaccurate.
Falling short of the moral baseline because of someone’s race
makes the offender a racist, as exemplified by John, our first
white male. Falling short of the supplementary ‘fair chance’ stipulation, provided one has respected all basic moral duties, makes
one morally reprehensible, but not a racist. It is this latter kind of
moral violation, and not the former, for which our second white
male, Jack, must be indicted. Labelling Jack a racist misses the
subtle difference between the two cases; Jack commits a racial
infringement, but not a racist one; he is being disrespectful of
black people, but in a different, and less morally harmful way
than racist John is. It would thus be a mistake to attach the same
level of moral opprobrium to him by assigning a duty, and not
just an additional stipulation of a ‘fair chance.’
The distinction between a racial infringement and a racist
one has been explored by Lawrence Blum.9 According to Blum,
one can commit a racial infringement without meriting the label
of ‘racist.’ Consider the case of an individual who, unbeknownst
the implications, makes an offensive joke just to go along with a
group of friends. As long as the said individual does not truly believe in inferiorizing and loathing the targeted racial group – in
other words, as long as her intentions are not genuinely antipathic
– it would be wrong to associate the morally loaded term, ‘racist,’
to such a person. The indicting term, ‘racist,’ should only be reserved for those who quite explicitly feel a certain way (recall
John, the individual in the first case), whereas those who commit
racial infringements as Jack’s deserve some other appellation;
racially insensitive, perhaps.
Our now piqued objector points out another difficulty. She
remarks that giving people of all races a fair chance won’t necessarily change our deep-seated race-based dating preferences. It
will only create an artificial, forced display of racial inclusivity,
while our original exclusionary racial preferences remain intact
and unchanged, albeit less conspicuous than before. Moreover,
not only may giving others a fair chance leave our preferences
unchanged, but white males like Jack may also act like they are
giving a fair chance to black people by going out on dates with
them, yet continue harboring anti-black dating preferences clan-
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destinely; they may drink coffee or chai tea with them, but they
are never actually going to date them. What to make of these cases?
To begin, we would say that white males who give a fair
chance only for show and are unprepared to honestly accept the
possibility of an inter-racial relationship aren’t really giving a fair
chance. Giving a fair chance means genuinely entertaining the
possibility of a future relationship with whomsoever one goes on
a date with regardless of her race, even if one doesn’t end up dating her. Putting this in context, truly giving a fair chance would
entail interacting with and thinking about people of all races identically to members of the favored race for a race-based preferential dater. Epistemic difficulties notwithstanding, Jack may not
end up with the black woman, but insofar as he treats her sincerely like a potential partner, he gives her a fair chance. It may also
help to clarify that I am not advocating a requirement to date people of multiple races. I am only advocating a stipulation to consider everyone equally, leaving aside their race. If, for some other
reason like socio-economic differences, clashing political sensibilities or geographical distances, Jack later decides to not date
the black woman, he would not be violating the ‘fair chance’
principle.
But what about the counterargument that giving a fair
chance to everyone doesn’t necessarily decolorize our dating
preferences? I contend that our desires, and our dating preferences, are shaped by the kinds of people we choose to interact
with and the kinds of spaces we inhabit. Exposure to different
perspectives, interactions with individuals of different races and
participating in situations where one is likely to learn about different cultural and racial backgrounds are certain to affect our racial predilections in dating. That the choices we make affect our
future preferences is an accepted psychological fact; thus, giving
a fair chance is very likely to dismantle deep-seated racial preferences in dating, contributing to a diverse outlook in the dating
world.10
This brings us to an important juncture in our discussion.
In today’s society, many of our deep-rooted racial preferences for
partners are ingrained and reinforced by the ubiquitous manifestations of patriarchal ideology “in advertising, articles in the media,
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in so-called success stories, [and] in Miss America pageants.”11 12
Our systems of mass communication are dominated by messages
demanding women to conform to a narrow image based around
the slim, “hot blond” in order to be attractive.13 The slim hotblond, one of only a few feminine “beauty imperative[s]”, “sets a
new norm: those who refuse to submit to it will become stigmatised.”14 While men are allowed more flexible standards for an
attractive body – the ‘dad’ bod, old men, geeks, nerds and effete
men –, racial beauty standards amongst males, too, have emerged
with white males at the top of the hierarchy. Such standards fashion the sexual desires of citizens of the modern society force-fed
with these beauty paradigms; people of all genders internalize and
then act upon warped beauty preferences to make dating decisions. This is what Amia Srinivasan calls the “political shaping of
our desires.”15 Online dating studies have showed that Asian
males and black females are the most racially excluded of all participants.16 These exclusions are indicative of assimilated racial
beauty standards that inform dating preferences. Since many of
our race-based dating preferences stem from unjust standards, it is
a responsibility to undertake an active reshaping of our desires to
create a more inclusive society. This is why giving a fair chance
to people of all races is a moral stipulation – interacting deeply
with diverse communities helps reform our desires and combat
unfair racial prioritization to create a truly racially integrated society. Given a society historically fractured along racial fault lines
and the pivotal role social discourse plays in shaping our preferences, offering people of all races a fair chance to become a potential partner is essential to redress racial inequity.17
One implication of my framework is that a fair chance
must be offered by peoples of all races to peoples of all races. In
other words, the ‘fair chance’ principle does not take into account
historical race relations or power dynamics, racial oppression or
stigmatization, prescribing instead an equal moral requirement to
all races. This may be objectionable because some same-race dating preferences are a show of solidarity within races that have
been and continue to be discriminated against, like black people
in America. Some would even say that moral obligations are
asymmetric, and the onus should be on the dominating race, i.e.
white people, to rectify the unjust beauty standards they have al-
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most singe-handedly created. The ‘fair chance’ principle thus
misses something important when it prescribes the same moral
stipulation for everyone.
I respectfully disagree. I believe people of all races, and
not just white people, have a moral responsibility to question, reconsider and re-cultivate their desires. Unjust racial beauty standards are internalized by everyone, so it is logical that everyone
partake in rectifying their nefarious effects, something effected by
giving everyone a ‘fair chance’ as a dating partner. Moreover,
giving a fair chance to everyone demonstrates a commitment to a
truly racially integrated society. Black-black intra-race dating
may be a display of solidarity, but to achieve a society socially
unified along racial lines, one absolved of racial separation and
stigmatization, we should entertain the possibility and even the
reality of interracial relationships. Solidarity may, of course, still
be shown alternatively by participating in black rights movements, campaigning for increased black political membership and
demonstrating against prejudiced laws that have persisted to this
day, for example. That everyone and not simply people who have
historically been in power are required to give a fair chance is
then an implication I am willing to accept.
To recapitulate, offering people of all races a ‘fair chance’
to become a potential partner is a moral stipulation we violate
when we exclude certain peoples as potential dating partners because of their race. In doing so, though not racist, we are still
morally blameworthy. Fulfilling the ‘fair chance’ requisite is necessary to overcome internalized racially prejudiced dating preferences, and to create a racially integrated and inclusive society.
Acting upon it is thus essential to create a more equitable world.
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